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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Melissa B. Jacoby’s essay1 pays homage to Stewart Macau-
lay’s classic study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, a U.S. federal 
consumer protection law that, according to Macaulay, was virtually un-
known to the lawyers whose clients needed it the most.2  The moral of Ma-
caulay’s study is that even good consumer protection laws on the books of-
ten fail to deliver in action for complex cultural, institutional, and economic 
reasons.3  Yet reducing Professor Jacoby’s essay to this very important 
moral undersells its contribution.  A fragmented infrastructure for legal 
service delivery of the sort she describes does not merely fail consumers 
more often than it should, but can frustrate economic policy, delay crisis 
response, and undermine financial stability.  By implication, rationalizing 
legal service provision is key to the success of both crisis management and 
financial reform. 
In this Comment, I first situate household debt in the context of financial 
stability.  Second, I highlight elements of Professor Jacoby’s argument 
most relevant to financial stability concerns.  Third, I sketch out several po-
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, Visiting 
Associate Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. Melissa B. Jacoby, The Legal Infrastructure of Ex Post Consumer Debtor Protec-
tions, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 751 (2011). 
 2. See id. at 761. 
 3. See id. 
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tential implications of her contribution for crisis response and financial 
regulation. 
I.  HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
By the end of the twentieth century, ordinary people joined the global 
capital markets in force.  The rapid expansion of consumer finance in re-
cent decades is variously attributed to government policy and the growth of 
financial and information technology.  For example, as governments loo-
sened restrictions on cross-border capital movements, Argentine, Icelandic, 
and Hungarian households borrowed in foreign currency, notably to 
finance housing with long-term loans, unavailable or prohibitively expen-
sive in local currency.  An Indian firm launched a public offering to fund 
tiny loans to the poor.4  Securitization techniques transformed small, idio-
syncratic, and illiquid consumer and housing loans made in the United 
States into standardized bundles packaged and repackaged to meet the risk 
and liquidity demands of diverse constituents around the globe.  Policy and 
market forces thus combined to produce a period of apparent global capital 
abundance, albeit one punctuated by financial crises that implicated house-
holds directly. 
The transformation of retail debt into wholesale capital flows had impor-
tant benefits in the form of economic growth and financial inclusion: more 
and cheaper money to the masses.  Therein too lay the costs.  More, cheap-
er money to the masses produced credit bubbles, which burst and left be-
hind insolvent institutions and over-indebted people in Argentina, Iceland, 
Hungary, India, and the United States alike.  Financial technology made it 
possible to multiply and spread consumer debt throughout the financial sys-
tem,5 with pockets of risk concentration in critical places.  If they are suffi-
ciently numerous, small consumer debts that populate key financial institu-
tions but exceed debtors’ capacity to pay can bring down the economy as a 
whole.  First, they can bankrupt creditors and disrupt intermediation.  
Second, they may depress consumer spending and with it aggregate con-
sumption, growth, and employment.  Third, they may neglect or rush to sell 
assets, such as homes, contributing to depressed asset prices.6  Other costs 
 
 4. Bruce Einhorn, A Microfinance IPO in India, BUS. WK., May 6, 2010, http://www. 
businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_20/b4178016201790.htm. 
 5. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble (Inst. for 
Law & Econ., Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Res. Paper No. 10-15, 2010), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1669401. 
 6. See LUC LAEVEN & THOMAS LARYEA, INT’L MONETARY FUND, PRINCIPLES OF 
HOUSEHOLD DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2009); Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the 
Link Between Consumer Financial Protection and Systematic Risk, 4 FIU L. REV. 435 
(2009); see also Anna Gelpern & Adam Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Wor-
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of turning consumer debt into capital markets debt are more subtle: for ex-
ample, securitization transplants a “contractual bankruptcy”7 model de-
signed for firms into the world of consumer finance for which they are ill-
suited.8 
It follows that stabilizing a complex modern financial system in crisis 
and creating a stable system going forward require capacity to manage 
household debt on a large scale.  Managing household debt with a view to 
financial stability is a task somewhat different from consumer protection 
for its own sake, or as a way to address social problems.  The size of ag-
gregate household debt and the elaborate ways in which household finances 
now link to critical economic and financial functions, make an ordinary 
person’s money troubles a matter of system-wide, or macroprudential,9 
concern. 
From the perspective of the system as a whole, in crisis, the principal 
goal is to reduce the aggregate level of consumer debt quickly, but mindful 
of the costs to creditors and fiscal authorities, as well as debtor and creditor 
moral hazard.  Outside the crisis context, the goal is to understand the way 
in which consumer debts can create large-scale social and financial vulne-
rabilities, and to design laws and institutions to address such vulnerabili-
ties.  For example, understanding behavioral biases and collective action 
problems in predatory lending,10 the effect of asset securitization on con-
tract modification,11 or the distinct path of failure in microfinance,12 can in-
 
kout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1127 
(2009). 
 7. See Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 6, at 1123. 
 8. See id. at 1124. 
 9. See generally Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, Macroprudential Policy—A 
Literature Review (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 337, 2011), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work337.pdf. 
 10. See Gerding, supra note 6. 
 11. See Sumit Agarwal et al., The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Renegotiation 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2011-02, 2011), available at http://www. 
chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/2011/wp2011_02.pdf; cf. Ma-
nuel Adelino et al., Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? The Effect of 
Securitization (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2009-17a, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/pubs/wp/wp0917a.pdf. 
 12. See Daniel Rozas, Throwing in the Towel: Lessons from MFI Liquidations, MICRO-
FINANCE FOCUS (2009), http://www.microfinancefocus.com/news/wp-content/uploads/2009/ 
09/Throwing-in-the-Towel.pdf; Soutik Biswas, India’s Micro-Finance Suicide Epidemic, 
BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010, 5:12 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-119975 
71; Yoolim Lee & George Smith Alexander, India’s Microfinance Clampdown May Trigger 
Failures, World Bank Aide Says, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2010-11-21/india-s-smaller-micro-lenders-likely-to-fail-srinivasan-says.html. 
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form consumer protection efforts and policy design for system-wide stabili-
ty. 
Government intervention, including sticks and carrots to promote con-
sumer debt relief, is justified where large-scale deleveraging must happen 
quickly, where institutional capacity is limited relative to the debt problem, 
where crisis conditions or other information problems impede market valu-
ation, and where collective action problems or rigid contracts discourage 
renegotiation.  Conditions for intervention may arise in a full-blown crisis, 
but also in more limited circumstances, where it becomes important to stop 
the spread of debt distress before it infects the system.  The manner of gov-
ernment involvement can range from facilitating case-by-case adjudication 
(e.g., more judges, tighter deadlines) to blanket contract modification, with 
options in between including conditional subsidies, streamlined administra-
tive procedures, and new substantive rights.  The choice depends on the 
reasons for intervention, as well as the government’s own fiscal and institu-
tional capacity.  This is where the infrastructure for delivering legal servic-
es becomes crucial. 
II.  HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND LEGAL SERVICES 
In 1933, a Minnesota couple sought to save their fourteen-room home 
and rental property from foreclosure.13  They applied to a judge for relief, 
citing the state foreclosure moratorium of the sort widespread at the time, 
which deferred the creditor’s enforcement for up to two years, provided the 
creditor received “reasonable rental value” in the interim.14  The measure 
famously and controversially survived challenge under the Contracts 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution as a time-limited exercise of existing state 
police power justified by extreme crisis circumstances.15  At the same time, 
the federal authorities enacted measures to strip gold indexation from pub-
lic and private contracts and revamp the regime for farm bankruptcies, as 
well as establish institutions to buy, guarantee, and restructure distressed 
mortgages, such as the Home Owners Loan Corporation.  None of these 
measures proved to be the silver bullet for broad-based household debt re-
duction, though some of the more radical measures gave debtors liquidity 
relief.  The crisis that began in 2007 brought about more timid incarnations 
of Depression-era measures, which have so far relied on voluntary action 
by debtors and creditors, and limited federal subsidies, with very modest 
 
 13. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 14. See id. at 415-16. 
 15. See id. 
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results for debt or liquidity relief.16  More durable structural changes, such 
as restoring borrowers’ capacity to modify home mortgages in bankruptcy, 
received new impetus with the crisis, although these have had no legislative 
success to date. 
There is no shortage of explanations for the failure of U.S. household de-
leveraging efforts to date, ranging from financial structure and servicer in-
capacity to accounting rules.  Addressing the criticisms and enacting mort-
gage modification in bankruptcy would no doubt improve the statistics.  
Professor Jacoby’s essay points to a new set of under-appreciated, impor-
tant, and deeply discomfiting reasons why even the most sensible fixes to 
substantive law might not produce debt relief on a scale necessary either to 
resolve the crisis, or to establish a sustainable infrastructure for household 
debt management going forward.17  Her insights are important because they 
potentially illuminate the difference between success and failure for subs-
tantive law reform; they are discomfiting because the problems she identi-
fies have no easy answers. 
Professor Jacoby paints a picture of a highly fragmented system, where 
state and federal authorities offer distinct and functionally overlapping le-
gal regimes to help debtors protect their assets (most importantly, their 
homes) in financial distress.18  A federal monopoly on coercive contract 
modification in bankruptcy gives borrowers powerful leverage against 
creditors in some circumstances, but at a high cost.  Some debtors may be 
able to keep their property and achieve other important objectives for less 
with ex post state protections.19  State protections, in turn, come by way of 
both uniform and non-uniform laws.20  Crises add an overlay of state and 
federal emergency measures.21 
The choice of protective strategies in multiple, overlapping, and highly 
complex legal systems can seem close to accidental in this telling.  Put dif-
ferently, today’s Blaisdells may have no understanding and no capacity to 
choose the way in which they shield what matters to them.  Even where the 
distressed debtors have the wherewithal to seek legal help, and to follow 
 
 16. See generally Making Home Affordable Program: Servicer Performance Report 
Through January 2011, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM, available at http://www. 
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/Jan_2011_ 
MHA_Report_FINAL.PDF; FHA Secure Refinancing Cancelled, FHA.COM, http://www.fha 
.com/fha_article.cfm?id=29 (last visited Mar. 16, 2011); MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE.GOV, 
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2011). 
 17. Jacoby, supra note 1, at 762-63. 
 18. Id. at 756-58. 
 19. Id. at 758-59. 
 20. Id. at 756. 
 21. Id. at 759. 
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through with any of the available remedy routes, the outcome may depend 
on the specialization of a nearby lawyer, an accident of geography.22 
This state of affairs is problematic enough as a matter of consumer pro-
tection, even allowing for the virtues of legal experimentation and regulato-
ry competition between state and federal authorities, and among states.  
Distressed debtors are left no means to make critical decisions at a time 
when they can least afford to be put in such a circumstance.  This state of 
affairs is even more problematic as a matter of economic policy and finan-
cial stability: a large-scale deleveraging program that depends on the ef-
forts of stressed and vulnerable individuals within multiple, overlapping, 
and highly complex expert systems may well be doomed to fail. 
III.  LEGAL SERVICES AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: WHAT IS TO BE 
DONE? 
One conceptually simple and likely unattainable, fix for the fragmenta-
tion of debtor protection “law in action” might be to educate all lawyers 
dealing with distressed debtors in all debtor protection systems, at least so 
they know when and how to seek help from other experts.  Some mix of 
professional licensing and private ordering might promote such an out-
come, but it seems burdensome and unlikely to come about soon.  Another 
possibility is to institute streamlined administrative procedures to replace 
the current patchwork of legal systems.  This too is a tall order.  Such 
measures, which have been used in some economies by way of crisis re-
sponse, are highly disruptive to the functioning of the existing legal system, 
and take a level of administrative capacity that, had it existed in the first 
place, might have made special procedures unnecessary.  Even so, there 
may be a case for streamlining in some areas, notably the restructuring of 
housing finance, where both leverage and social costs of failure are high. 
Professor Jacoby’s essay hints at another possibility: greater use of insti-
tutional intermediaries, especially non-lawyers, to help debtors choose the 
appropriate mix of legal and financial tools to resolve distress.23  The ongo-
ing housing finance crisis has helped start a cadre of such intermediaries 
among and beyond legal professionals; however, experience to date shows 
that an unregulated market for intermediary services is at high risk for 
fraud and abuse, exacerbated by distressed debtors’ heightened vulnerabili-
ty to exploitation.  Reputable nonprofits offer a variation on the interme-
diary theme; however, their operations are unlikely to be scalable to the 
point of addressing financial stability.  Moreover, nonprofit regulation does 
 
 22. See id. at 760-62. 
 23. See id. at 764. 
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not lend itself easily to regulation for the quality of legal and financial ser-
vices provided or referred. 
In sum, fragmentation in the institutional structure for providing legal 
services to distressed debtors can be an impediment not just to the goals of 
consumer protection, but also to the financial stability objective when it re-
quires household debt restructuring.  An important implication of Professor 
Jacoby’s argument is that such fragmentation can distort ex ante lending 
and borrowing incentives, and can frustrate timely management of con-
sumer debt distress before a full-blown crisis has broken out.24  In this way, 
the legal infrastructure within which debtor-creditor law is practiced may 
both contribute to the build-up of household debt, and impede its resolu-
tion. 
CONCLUSION 
Consumers are a volume business when times are good, as well as when 
times are bad.  Finding an institutional approach to manage the volume 
without sacrificing equity, while preserving and enhancing incentives for 
sound lending and borrowing, is an urgent task.  Professor Jacoby’s essay 
makes an important contribution to mapping out such an approach. 
 
 24. It does not seem clear which way the distortion would run. 
